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Networks have been discovered for which Network Exchange Theory  
(NET Markovsky, Willer and Patton 1988; Lovaglia, Skvoretz,  
Willer and Markovsky 1995) fails to provide tenable  
predictions. Here we elaborate NET to create a more general  
method. We show not only when and where exchange networks break  
into simpler substructures, but propose rules to decisively  
classify networks and substructures as strong, weak, or equal  
power. In doing so, we advance general heuristics for power  
development in exchange networks and demonstrate the promise of  
an approach using reciprocal comparison of general heuristics,  
formal theory, and computer simulation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
   Exchange networks must first be classified by power type  
before an accurate prediction of power distribution in the  
network can be made (Markovsky, Skvoretz, Willer, Lovaglia and  
Erger 1993). Here we classify networks as strong, weak, or  
equal power. In strong power networks, high power actors can  
use power with impunity. That is, over a series of exchange  
opportunities, they come to control nearly all available  
resources. By contrast, in weak power networks, power use by  
high power actors results in countervailing changes in exchange  
relations, changes that moderate future power use. Power in  
these networks reaches a stable equilibrium in which high power  
actors maintain a reliable, though moderate, advantage. That  
equilibrium point can be accurately predicted for positions in  
a wide variety of weak power networks (Skvoretz and Willer  
1993; Lovaglia, Skvoretz, Willer and Markovsky 1995). Finally,  
in networks of equal power, no actor has an exchange advantage;  
thus, no resource differentiation is predicted in them. 
 
   The Graph-theoretical Power Index (GPI) method developed by  
Markovsky, Willer and Patton (1988) and Markovsky, Skvoretz,  
Willer, Lovaglia, and Erger (1993) uses a path-counting  
algorithm to identify how advantaged one actor is in comparison  
to another. A position's GPI value is calculated by counting  
non-intersecting paths of different lengths leading away from  
it, with odd-length paths adding advantage, even-length paths  
taking away advantage. 
 
   Consider the network in Figure 1 suggested by Noah Friedkin  
(personal communication). Position A has a single 1-path to B,  
a 2-path to C (the 2-path to D would intersect with the first  
2-path at B and so is not counted), a 3-path through B and C to  
D, and a 4-path through B, C, D, and ahead to the other C.  
Adding 1 to the GPI index for the 1-path and 3-path while  
subtracting 1 for the 2-path and 4-path yields a GPI value of 0  
for position A. In contrast, position B has four 1-paths, a 2- 
path through C to D, and a 3-path through C and D to the other  
C. Thus its GPI value is 4 - 1 + 1 = 4. (See Markovsky et al.  
1988 for details of GPI analysis.) 
 
Figure 1. Friedkin Network and GPI Values  
 
           C                  0 
          / \                / \ 
     A - B - D          0 - 4 - 3 
          \ /                \ /  
           C                  0 
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   When GPI values differ for two positions, one has a strong  
power advantage over the other. Markovsky et al. (1988, Axiom  
2) assume that actors seek exchange with partners whose GPI  
value is lower than theirs. Or, if all partners have a GPI  
value equal to or greater than an actor, the actor is assumed  
to seek exchange with the weakest partner(s) available. How- 
ever, exchange is possible only when an actor and a partner  
mutually seek exchange with each other. Hence, if an actor and  
a partner do not mutually seek each other, that tie is broken.  
When such broken ties cause networks to break into subnetworks,  
GPI is iteratively applied to resulting subnetworks.  
 
   Using Axiom 2 to analyze the Friedkin network, C actors will  
seek exchange with D, but not B. The network breaks into an A-B  
dyad and a C-D-C 3-line network. GPI equals 1 for the positions  
in the dyad. In the 3-line, D's GPI equals 2, whereas C's  
equals 0. The exchange seek assumption then applies to these  
new GPI scores. C actors seek exchange with B, but not with D,  
thus leaving D isolated from the rest of the network. Iterating  
GPI again returns the dyad and 3-line. The analysis cycles  
indefinitely from one iteration to the other. Thus, the  
Friedkin network cannot be classified as strong power.  
Nevertheless, simulation using Markovsky's X-Net program shows  
that B and D are in fact strong power positions (Markovsky in  
press describes the simulator). 
 
   The anomalous Friedkin network has a relatively easy  
solution, a modification of the exchange seek assumption.  
Markovsky et al. (1988) assume that C actors will see exchange  
with D while avoiding B because B is more powerful than D.  
However, whenever a strong power advantage exists, low power  
actors eventually lose nearly all available resources.  
Intuitively, it matters little to a disadvantaged actor whether  
the difference in GPI scores is large or small. As such, a  
better specification of the exchange seek assumption is: 
 
   Revised Exchange Seek Assumption (Axiom 2) 
 
   Actors seek exchange with those less powerful than they are.  
   If no actors with less power are available, actors seek  
   exchange with actors of equal power. If, however, no actors  
   of equal power are available, actors seek exchange with more  
   powerful actors. 
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   Applying the revised exchange seek assumption to the  
Friedkin network, C actors seek both B and D and the network  
does not break into subnetworks. We classify it as a strong  
power network because GPI values differ for related actors.  
Although this new axiom thus satisfactorily resolves the  
anomaly of the Friedkin network, exploring its implications  
soon revealed other networks that challenged GPI analysis. 
 
Heuristics in the Construction of Test Networks 
 
   It is difficult to find networks that test theoretical  
advances. GPI, for instance, was in use for six years before  
the Friedkin network was discovered. Here we develop a general  
method of iterating GPI by building up complex networks from  
simpler structures, using heuristics about the way power  
develops through exchange (Willer and Willer 1995). Then, we  
use GPI analysis to see whether it indicates strong power. When  
a discrepancy occurs between GPI and heuristic analysis, we  
simulate the network using the X-Net program. In all cases thus  
far, the X-Net simulator and the analyses that employ the  
following heuristics have agreed. 
 
   Heuristic 1: Adding a relation between a low strong-power 
     position and a high strong-power position does not change  
     the type of power of any position in the network. 
 
   Heuristic 2: Adding a relation between two high strong- 
     power positions does not change the type of power of any  
     position in the network. 
 
   Heuristic 3: Adding a relation between two low strong-power 
     positions creates a weak or equal power structure. 
 
   Heuristic 4: Adding a relation between weak or equal power  
     positions cannot create a strong power structure. 
 
   Heuristic 5: Breaks occur between high strong-power  
     positions or between high strong-power positions and  
     equal or weak power positions, but not between equal or  
     weak power positions. 
 
(Cf. Willer and Willer 1995 for heuristics 1, 2 and 3.) 
 
   Our explorations uncovered many networks for which GPI  
analysis produced repeating cycles of subnetworks that would  
not allow for the classification of positions as strong power  
in any simple way, even though simulation and heuristic  
analysis suggested that strong power was present. Further  
analysis of the problem was necessary that, when performed,  
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yielded a general method for the GPI analysis of networks. The  
method decomposes a network into strong power, weak power, and  
equal power components. The heuristics and computer simulation  





   The general method for iterating GPI to decompose complex  
networks uses the following 7 rules: 
 
1. Iterate GPI using the new exchange seek assumption until a 
   stable solution--wherein GPI values of all positions  
   remain the same in two consecutive iterations--or a repeat- 
   ing cycle of solutions emerges. A stable solution ends  
   analysis. 
 
2. (a) When a stable solution appears, inequalities between  
   connected positions indicate strong power.  
 
   (b) When a repeating cycle of solutions appears, draw the 
   network that includes all relations across iterations in  
   the cycle except when (i) breaks occur in every iteration  
   of a repeating cycle and (ii) a position has a GPI advan- 
   tage over other connected positions in every iteration of  
   a repeating cycle. In (i), the breaks are considered  
   permanent and are not redrawn. In (ii), the advantaged and 
   disadvantaged positions form a strong power component that  
   breaks off permanently. Then, reiterate GPI on the redrawn  
   network until a stable solution or repeating cycle of  
   solutions appears. 
 
3. Re-apply rule 2 until the redrawn network is identical to  
   the previous application's redrawn network or until a re- 
   peating cycle of redrawn networks appears. 
 
   Rules 1 - 3 above identify most strong power structures in  
exchange networks. (A computer program for analyzing networks  
using these rules is available from John Skvoretz.) However,  
computer simulation reveals that some structures harbor strong  
power differences not identified by the first three rules. For  
example, consider the 7p40 network in Figure 2 below. (We  
started labeling networks sequentially for each size. 7p40 is  
the 40th network with 7 positions.)   
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Figure 2. 7p40 Network 
 
     A - B - C - B - A 
          \     / 
           D - D 
 
   All positions in the 7p40 network have GPI values of 1. We  
would not classify this network as strong power, nor would we  
predict any breaks in negotiations between network positions.  
However, computer simulations and the heuristics tell a  
different and convincing story. The B positions in the 5-line,  
A-B-C-B-A, are high strong power. In addition, each B is  
connected to one member of the D-D dyad. The heuristics reveal  
that D actors will initiate a break from the B actors. D actors  
will prefer to exchange equally with each other rather than  
exchange at a disadvantage with B actors. In turn, B actors are  
indifferent to exchange with D actors because B actors have low  
strong-power alternatives to exploit. X-Net simulation confirms  
that a break will develop between B and D actors, and that B  
actors have a strong power advantage over A and C actors. 
 
   The following rules correctly decompose networks such as  
7p40 that have strong power hidden within them. The rules work  
by breaking down networks to their core structures to insure  
that no lurking potential for strong power remains undetected.   
 
4. Look for a "stem-dyad" in networks and subnetworks that 
   have not been identified as strong power. A stem-dyad  
   is understood to be a position of degree 1 (i.e., con- 
   nected to only one other actor) and the position con- 
   nected to it. The position connected to the degree 1  
   position has the potential to be high power. Thus we call 
   it the high power position in the stem-dyad; and, we call  
   the degree 1 position the low power position in the  
   stem-dyad. 
 
5. Remove the stem-dyad from the network and examine the  
   residual network. 
 
6. (a) If the residual is strong power and if the high  
   power position in the stem can reconnect to a low power  
   position in the residual, then the original structure is  
   strong power. 
 
   (b) If the residual is strong power and if the high power 
   position in the stem can reconnect only to high power  
   positions in the residual, then the stem breaks from the  
   residual as an equal power dyad. 
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   (c) If the residual breaks into strong and weak power  
   components while the high power position in the stem  
   connects to a low strong-power position in the residual, 
   then the network breaks where the residual breaks. 
 
7. For remaining structures not identified as strong power, 
   re-apply steps 4 - 6. Continue until no stem dyads remain 
   attached to a larger structure not yet identified as  
   strong power. Then reconnect all relations among structures 
   not identified as strong power. 
 
Rules 4 - 7 allow networks of any size to be broken down to  an  
easily analyzed core structure. For example, consider a 7-  
actor line A-B-C-D-E-F-G. First remove the stem-dyad, A-B,  
leaving a five-actor line. (Note that removing F-G instead has  
the same result.) If the power type of a five-actor line is  
unknown, remove the stem-dyad, C-D, from it. The remaining core  
structure, E-F-G, is a 3-line, the prototypical strong power  
structure. Hence, we conclude that the 7-Line is a strong power  
structure. Now try the 7p40 network. Removing the A-B stem-dyad  
results in a 5-actor T structure, which breaks into a strong  
power 3-line and a dyad (Markovsky et al. 1988). Therefore, by  
rule 6c and through symmetry, 7p40 breaks into a 5-actor line  
and a dyad. 
 
   Rules 1 - 7 should identify all strong power structures--at  
least all those in networks of 7 or fewer positions. (More  
complex networks may require more subtle analysis.) We have  
used them to analyze more than 200 6-position and 7-position  
networks without finding predictions at odds with simulations  
or other forms of analysis. Having thus identified and broken  
out strong power structures, remaining networks can be analyzed  
using the probability tree method of Markovsky et al. (1993) to  
determine whether weak power exists in them. The method can  
therefore be said to classify the fundamental power type  
(strong, weak, or equal) of all positions in all exchange  
networks. Exact resource point predictions at equilibrium can  
then be made using the method of Lovaglia et al. (1995). 
 
   Pending empirical confirmation, this iterative GPI method  
appears to solve a fundamental, though narrow, problem in  
network exchange theory. Moreover, the heuristics developed as  
tools in the solution have general implications. For example,  
in exchange networks it seems impossible to gain a strong power  
advantage by opening channels of exchange to weak or equal  
power network members. Rather, strong power can only be  
achieved by cutting off the alternative exchange opportunities  
of one's partners (oppression), or by establishing new  
connections to isolated individuals outside the network  
(colonization).  
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   More generally, we are developing a procedure for conducting  
social exchange research. We compare the results of analyses  
using general heuristics, formal theory, and computer  
simulation. Although these analyses are related to the extent 
that they make similar predictions, all begin from quite  
different foundations. Those networks for which analyses differ  
thus become the target sites of future research. Hence, one can  
systematically analyze all networks of a certain size, culling  
anomalous networks for further study. As such, locating  
interesting test networks may no longer be a hit-or-miss  
endeavor requiring years of ancillary study, thus bringing  
closer the goal of analyzing networks of the size and  
complexity found in naturally occurring social situations.  
 
   In addition, the increasing complications of the GPI have  
led us to develop an independent method for determining whether  
networks are strong, weak, or equal power. After examining over  
two hundred networks, the iterative GPI and the new method make  
identical predictions, thereby validating GPI and adding a new  
dimension to our evolving general procedure. Consequently, we  
will be able to compare the predictions of two independent  
formal theories with each other and with general heuristics and  
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